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There are people of intelligence who can learn as many of
the facts of science as they like, but
. . . they lack the spirit of science.
For them it is enough to have discovered any hypothesis at all
concerning any matter,
then they are at once on fire for it and believe the whole thing
is accomplished.
To possess an opinion is to them the same thing as to become
a fanatical adherent to it,
and henceforth to lay it to their heart as a conviction . . .
Insofar as genius of every kind maintains the fire of convictions
and awakens distrust of the modesty
and circumspection of science, it is an enemy of truth,
no matter how much it may believe itself to be truth’s suitor.
- Nietzsche, Human all too Human I: 635
GETTING BEYOND EXTENDED MINDS
After years of debate, philosophers, and cognitive scientists are
still divided over the question of the extent of cognition. Does
cognition happen entirely in the brain or is it, instead, a dynamic
and interactive phenomenon that constitutively involves the envi-
ronment, both spatially and temporally? Clark and Chalmers
(1998) created recent interest in this discussion in their seminal
paper “The Extended Mind,” famously defending the thesis that,
at least in some cases of cognition, the world plays a constitutive
role. Critics of the Extended Mind thesis agree that external, envi-
ronmental interactions matter for enabling and shaping cognition
in non-trivial ways, but they insist that exogenous influences
make nothing but purely causal contributions (e.g., Adams and
Aizawa, 2001, 2008, 2010; Fodor, 2009)—that, at best, non-neural
factors play a merely supportive role in shaping and enabling cog-
nition. The energetic production of publications arguing back
and forth over the issue, wave after wave, is a sign that the
extended mind debate has not been settled in favor of any of the
contending parties.
In Radicalizing Enactivism, Hutto and Myin (2013)
articulate and defend a radically enactive and embodied—
thoroughly non-contentful—vision of basic cognition (REC for
short)1. Enactivism is inspired by the insight that the embedded
and embodied activity of living beings provides the right model
for understanding minds. According to the radical version of
enactivism defended in Hutto and Myin (2013), the vast sea of
what humans do and experience is best understood by appealing
to dynamically unfolding, situated embodied interactions and
engagements with worldly offerings. Radical enactivism thus goes
against the commonly held position that the best explanation
of cognition always and everywhere requires positing contents
that are acquired and transformed in order to create represen-
tations that then inform and guide what an organism does or
experiences. Contents are understood as ways of representing the
world that have conditions of satisfaction. As Crane observes:
“To say that any state has content is just to say that it represents
the world as being a certain way. It does have . . . a ‘correctness
condition’—the condition under which it represents correctly”
(Crane, 1992, p. 139).
Hutto and Myin (2013) defend the view that accepting REC
has the advantage of enabling us to transform the terms of the
1To prevent misunderstanding, it is important to clarify what “basic” cog-
nition means on a REC account. REC promotes the possibility that there
are kinds of mind that lack content, namely that non-representational minds
exist. REC also allows that contentful minds exist. It assumes not only that
there are a variety of types of minds (some are contentful, some not) but also
that non-contentful minds are, phylogenetically and ontogenetically, basic.
Non-contentful minds are the most fundamental kinds of minds. Content-
involving modes of cognition are necessarily scaffolded modes of cognition.
From a REC perspective contentful thought is not a feature of all forms of
cognition, rather it is a special achievement. Being basic doesn’t imply low-
grade; there may be many quite important and sophisticated yet basic forms
of non-contentful cognition.
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extended mind dispute in the philosophy of mind. Specifically, its
seventh chapter argues that endorsing REC provides both a spur
and the sufficient means of moving beyond the “extended mind”
debate. The book’s diagnosis is that a fundamental obstacle to
progress in the extended mind dispute is a continued commit-
ment to the idea that cognition is necessarily content involving
(CIC for short), something that has been accepted by those on
both sides of it (Hutto and Myin, 2013, pp. 135–136). According
to a REC analysis, if we let go of the CIC assumption our under-
standing of the extent of cognition is transformed, requiring a
complete reconceiving of the standard extended mind debate. If
we are correct, giving up on the idea that minds are essentially
representational—always and everywhere content involving—is a
game changer both for defenders of the extended mind theory
and its internalist opponents. The reasoning is straightforward.
Assume that basic cognition is not representational in a contentful
sense. If so, then the clearest and cleanest grounds for internalism
are undercut. For if basic cognition is not inherently contentful
then defenders of internalism lose their most compelling reason
for supposing that cognition—at least in its primary phylogenetic
and developmental forms—is an “inner” business (where “inner”
is understood in the sense of implying a cerebral location of the
vehicles of content). Of course, many defenders of the extended
mind theory also accept or presuppose that cognition is content
involving. They disagree about the location and extent of the vehi-
cles of such content. From a REC perspective the vehicle/content
distinction does not apply at the level of basic minds: where there
is no content there are no vehicles of content. Thus, if it turns
out that basic forms of cognition are not contentful the extended
mind debate should be transformed.
These observations about how the extended mind debate
would be transformed if cognitive science adopted radical, non-
representationalist theories of basic cognition seize on the fact
that the standard, and strongest, move internalists can make to
motivate their position is to appeal to a notion of narrow or
intrinsic content (Adams and Aizawa, 2010). The appeal to men-
tal content features crucial in internalist arguments because it
is needed to provide a principled “mark of the cognitive”—one
which backs up and gives definition to demarcation claims about
what is constitutive of, as opposed to merely causally supportive
of, cognition. This assumption is widespread and easy to find in
the literature. The following quotations epitomize familiar sen-
timents about the representational mark of the cognitive and its
perceived importance:
Admittedly, delimiting the scope of the “cognitive” is not an easy
matter, but . . . it seems adequate to specify that cognitive states,
structures, and capacities are mental entities with representational
content (Khalidi, 2007, p. 93).
Without representation cognitive science is utterly bereft of tools
for explaining natural intelligence. We would go further: without
representation there is no cognitive (as distinct from behavioral,
biologic, or just plain physical) science in the first place (O’Brien
and Opie, 2009, p. 54).
It seems that anyone with a stake in debates about the extent
of cognition and who abandons the representationalist “mark
of the cognitive” must supply a tenable alternative; otherwise
there is no clear cut way of distinguishing the cognitive from the
non-cognitive.
Ultimately, we agree with O’Brien and Opie (2009). In the
absence of an appeal to content there is no obvious alternative way
to ground claims about what constitutes the cognitive in a scrupu-
lous scientific manner. As we aim to show, one consequence of
this is that without appeal to a notion of content to supply the
mark of the cognitive—or an adequate replacement notion that
can play that role—there is no principled way to advance the
claim that cognition is neurally based. How else, other than by
appeal to content, might the claim that cognitive processes are
“contained in the brain” be supported? How else could it be estab-
lished that, as a matter of fact, cognition is always and necessarily
brainbound? Appeals to facts about brains or behavior on their
own, lacking supplement by a substantive theory of cognition—
we will argue—do not warrant that conclusion. We will return to
this.
In all, from a REC perspective, to let go of the idea that basic
cognition is necessarily contentful and representational in charac-
ter is to remove a standardly assumed barrier to seeing at least this
form of cognition as constitutively world-involving. Such a shift
in perspective is tantamount to acknowledging that fundamental
cases of perceiving and thinking are not necessarily grounded in,
nor do they take the form of, representing aspects of the world
or having contentful thoughts about those aspects. And to think
this aligns perfectly with understanding cognitive processes as a
form of wide reaching activity that is—at root—extensive and
unbounded; thus extensive minds are not merely, occasionally
and in special circumstances, extended.
INSUFFICIENCY AND IRRELEVANCE
Not everyone agrees that going radically enactive about cognition
has these implications for the debate about the extent of cog-
nition. In this section we focus on two charges that have been
leveled, not against the truth of REC, but against its significance
in this domain.
Wheeler (2014) claims that enactivism, even its non-
representational variants, lacks the requisite theoretical resources
to see off internalism about the machinery of cognition (or as
he describes it the “whereabouts of our cognitive architecture”).
He maintains that REC’s claims about the extensive and consti-
tutively world-involving relationality of basic cognitive acts are
insufficient for rejecting internalism: by his lights, when it comes
to putting internalism out of business REC “falls short of what is
needed” (2014, p. 1)2.
He holds, by contrast, that extended functionalism—all on its
own and without the aid of non-representationalism—suffices
for rejecting internalism: extended functionalism, if he is right,
does the trick whether it endorses representationalism or not.
Consequently, he claims that extended functionalism can carry
the day in the extended mind debate while remaining studiously
neutral or agnostic about the question of the representational
2Wheeler defended this view in his closing keynote to the Varieties of
Enactivism: A Conceptual Geography symposium, hosted by the AISB-50 in
April 2014.
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nature of cognition. In taking this line Wheeler denies the strong
connection that RECers see as holding between representation-
alism, how we ought to understand the extent of mind and the
rejection of internalism3.
Sutton (2014) also doubts that non-representationalism is rel-
evant to debates over the extent of cognition. He holds that
whether internal representations are assumed to exist or not is
orthogonal to the internalism-externalism dispute—at least, if
one’s unit of analysis is cognitive activity understood as a public,
distributed process. If Sutton is right, explanations of distributed
cognitive activity (his examples are taken from the science of
memory) can proceed without our having to get clear about, let
alone settle questions about the existence (or otherwise) of men-
tal representations. Although he doesn’t always explicitly pitch his
detailed discussions in terms of philosophical debates about men-
tal representations, for him it remains an open question to what
extent, for example, a “radically revised notion of the internal
memory trace” commits theorists to mental representationalism
(Sutton, 2014, p. 5). We need not be delayed by debates about
the representational nature of mind in order to move memory
research ahead, for example, since the real action in cognitive
science does not depend on answering questions about whether
minds represent or not. Hence Sutton’s verdict is that debates
about the existence or otherwise of mental representations are
orthogonal to moving forward in (a) the internalism-externalism
debate and (b) the explanatory project of understanding cognitive
activity as a socio-culturally distributed process.
We disagree with both Wheeler (2014) and Sutton (2014).
But before scrutinizing their views, let’s consider, in order to set
aside, a possible diagnosis of why non-representationalism may
be thought to be irrelevant to the extended mind dispute. It
might be thought that the issue of mental representationalism is
entirely beside the point. Why think so? Here’s a line of reason-
ing. Externalism and internalism take different forms depending
on one’s theory of mental representations. Different varieties of
representational theory of mind assume that mental representa-
tions, whatever specific properties they happen to have, must—as
a class—have content (of some kind) and vehicles (of some kind)
if they are to qualify as representations at all. The qualification
“of some kind” is important for it reminds us that it is suffi-
cient only that the vehicle-content distinction is in play: it does
not matter which particular form it takes. Against this backdrop
it is possible to capture the main theoretical combinations in
the internalism-externalism debate using a four-fold matrix. One
can pair: (i) vehicle-internalism with content-internalism (Fodor,
1990); (ii) vehicle internalism with content-externalism (Fodor,
1994; Dretske, 1995); and (iii) vehicle-externalism with content-
externalism (Wilson, 2004; Rowlands, 2010). It is also logically
3Thus Wheeler (2014) claims, “one leading alternative to enactivism in 4E
space, namely extended functionalism, is in the position to robustly reject
[internalism about cognitive architecture] but, unlike enactivism, has no the-
oretical interest in rejecting [content-bearing representations]” (p. 1). Indeed
he goes further and says, “Against Hutto and Myin, I shall briefly present
an analysis which indicates that to the extent that extended functional-
ism can be adequately defended, it can be defended in a representationalist
register” (p. 1).
possible to pair (iv) vehicle-externalism with content-internalism
(though we know of no one who adheres to this view).
What does this set of possible pairings show? One answer is
that it reveals that questions about mental representations are
orthogonal or irrelevant to what one thinks about the extent of
cognition precisely because in adopting any one of the four com-
binations about representational vehicles and content won’t settle
the debate. In this light, progress in the extended mind debate
can seem to require giving consideration to factors and features
of cognition other than those concerning mental representations.
But it would be a mistake to conclude from this line of reason-
ing that the outcome of debates about whether cognition involves
mental representations is irrelevant to how to best understand the
extent of mind. Why? Firstly, if decisive arguments could be found
to favor one of these four theories of mental representation—
giving compelling reason to favor it over its rivals—this would
bring discussions about the extent of mind to a close. So, far
from being irrelevant, considerations about mental representa-
tions look as if they lie at the very heart of this dispute, and
the fact that we cannot decide between the existing candidate
views is in part what sustains debates about the extent of mind.
Secondly, and relatedly, if representationalism is rejected tout
court—if the issue of whether cognition is representational at all is
moot—then the common ground for the extended mind debate,
as characterized by this matrix, collapses under the very feet of all
parties.
Consider an analogy. Several political parties disagree about
the appropriateness of introducing new tax laws—each canvass-
ing different combinatorial options. None of these parties ques-
tion the need for taxation. Of course, merely recognizing that
there is a need for taxation would not decide which combined
tax law should be adopted. Other considerations would have to be
brought to bear. But that hardly makes questions of taxation irrel-
evant or orthogonal. The choice between the various tax options
on offer rests on the unquestioned assumption of a need for tax-
ation. Foundationally, the imagined disputants agree on the need
for taxation—hence taxation could not fail to be relevant to their
political debate: it is the very basis upon which that debate is con-
ducted. And, obviously, were taxation to be abolished the entire
debate about different possible tax laws would be pointless. By the
same token, it is difficult to see how one’s stand on mental repre-
sentation could be irrelevant or orthogonal to the extended mind
debate and our best understanding of the extent of mind.
FROM EXTENDED FUNCTIONALISM TO EXTENSIVE
ENACTIVISM
Let’s approach the question from a different angle: how
might we understand the extent of mind if we adopt a non-
representationalist extensive enactivism and what might motivate
one to adopt such a position? First things first. In Hutto and Myin
(2013), it was argued that understanding cognition as extensive
and not extended is a consequence of adopting REC. Yet questions
have been raised about the very idea of extensive minds that REC
recommends. Wheeler (2014) wonders: “What does this [notion
of extensiveness] mean?” (p. 1). By way of reply it is important to
note that coining the label “extensive” was meant as a corrective—
it was designed to highlight both what is, at once, right and wrong
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with the “extended mind” metaphor. How are the notions dif-
ferent? Wheeler captures the subtlety perfectly, when he asks:
“is mind a phenomenon whose primary ontological manifes-
tation is inner, but which sometimes spreads beyond the skin
(extended functionalism as often understood), or a phenomenon
that is widely constituted in its very essence (the extensive mind
of radical enactivism)[?]” (p. 2).
As a first pass answer, we think Wheeler’s rhetorical query cap-
tures the difference well enough. We will explicate the notion of
extensiveness in greater detail in Section Extensiveness Explicated.
For the moment we respond to those who think, despite admit-
ting that the original “extended mind” terminology has its diffi-
culties, there is no need to take up our neologism. Sutton (2014),
for example, thinks following our lead on this score is unneces-
sary. As he sees it, other serviceable replacements are, and have
long been, readily available in the literature:
It is true that the word “extended” can easily be misread as assum-
ing a more basic inner cognitive system which only spreads later
in development. For this reason, the well-established pre-existing
label “distributed cognition” should be preferred (Hutchins,
2014): there is no need for the awkward enactivist coinage “exten-
sive mind” (Sutton, 2014, p. 14).
We agree with Sutton that the label “extended mind” has prob-
lematic connotations. If the only choice is between “extended
mind” and “distributed cognition” then we prefer the latter. But
the notion of extensive minds not only captures what is right
in the idea that minds are already world-involving in their basic
forms, it also sets its face against internalism in a way that
those who endorse the distributed cognition framework do not.
Distributed cognition—as Hutchins defines, and Sutton endorses,
it—denotes a pragmatic stance through which hypotheses about
the extent of mind can be formed and tested. Thus, “to take the
distributive perspective is not to make any claim about the nature of
the world. Rather, it is to choose a way of looking at the world, one
that selects scales of investigations such that wholes are seen as
emergent from interactions among their parts” (Hutchins, 2014,
p. 36, emphases added).
Understood as a pragmatic stance, distributed cognition may
well be the right explanatory attitude to adopt. But what does
adoption of this stance tell us about the extent of mind? Taking
it up requires making and defending claims about the extent of
cognition in specific cases in the light of empirical findings—for
only then do the metaphysical questions have real grip. What does
this rule in or out about the extent of minds in general? Answer:
the extent of mind is shifty. In some cases and on some scales
cognition is wide-ranging, on others it may be wholly internally
constituted.
A central claim of the distributed cognition framework is that the
proper unit of analysis for cognition should not be set a priori, but
should be responsive to the nature of the phenomena under study.
For some sorts of phenomena the skin or skull of an individual
is exactly the correct boundary. For some phenomena, the whole
person is just too big and including the whole organism would
involve too many interactions. For other phenomena, setting the
boundary of the unit of analysis at the skin will cut lines of interac-
tion in ways that leave key aspects of the phenomena unexplained
or unexplainable (Hutchins, 2010, p. 426).
Extensive enactivism is not, by contrast, compatible with internal-
ism. We believe that theoretical considerations about the nature
of information and the problems they raise for naturalizing con-
tent tip the balance in favor of non-representational theories of
basic cognition. This, in turn, gives us reason to reject internal-
ism, and—indeed—to move beyond the extended mind debate
as traditionally formulated. By implication, it gives us reason to
think that answers to the question of the extent of mind will not
be shifty in the way fans of distributed cognition propose.
Is this to favor metaphysical pronouncements and postur-
ing over empirically informed theorizing about cognition? No.
The relation between philosophical and scientific contributions
is complex. Following the lead of neo-Quineans, when it comes
to understanding the nature and extent of cognition we think the
philosophical job is two-fold:
The metaphysican has work to do, first, in helping to determine
what our best theories are (weighing up the theoretic virtues of
competing theories), and second, in determining what . . . those
theories commit us to . . . The work is neither empirical nor con-
ceptual (indeed those two cannot be separated . . . ) (Thomasson,
2014, p. 107).
Philosophical considerations about the features of the best global
theory of cognition, we think, tell against the idea that basic minds
are contentful and this is what pushes us to adopt the notion
of extensive minds. But to explicate the notion of extensiveness
more thoroughly and motivate it properly we need to go beyond
the first pass characterization offered above. For some will still
find that characterization of extensiveness imperspicuous. There
is a need, as Wheeler (2014) identifies, to say more about “pre-
cisely how are we to explicate the property of extensiveness, and
thus what it means for mind to be ‘widely constituted in its very
essence’?” (p. 2).
Paving the way for a more developed answer to Wheeler’s ques-
tion, let’s begin by considering problems that beset various kinds
of non-representationalist extended functionalism. Roughly ren-
dered: non-representational functionalism, extended or other-
wise, is a pure form of functionalism. Pure functionalism does
not entail any kind of representationalism: pure functionalism is
a weaker thesis than representational functionalism.
There are two ways of formulating a pure functionalism. One
way is to adopt some kind of functionalism based wholly on
empirical science. The second way seeks to establish function-
alism’s legitimacy by appeal to ordinary talk and thought about
the mental. In what follows we will argue that any pure empirical
functionalism, extended or not, that abandons representational-
ism without supplementing that loss with an alternative substan-
tive theory of cognition, is inadequate as a means of demarcating
the extent of the cognitive. By contrast common sense function-
alism appears to have better prospects in this regard. However, if
such a functionalism takes seriously (as it must) everyday thought
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 706 | 4
Hutto et al. Extensive enactivism: why keep it all in?
and talk about cognition, then there are reasons for thinking of
cognition as wide, world-involving phenomena yet, at the same
time, a proper investigation of our everyday talk of the mental
provides no justification for adopting a functionalist framework
for understanding cognition in the first place.
In reviewing the fate of non-representational, pure extended
functionalism in both its scientific and commonsense formula-
tions we will ultimately be in a position to explicate the notion of
extensiveness such that it will become clear why asking questions
about boundaries of the cognitive is always a matter of asking
questions that take stock of the world-relatedness of cognition.
EXTENDED FUNCTIONALISM VIA EMPIRICAL
FUNCTIONALISM
What case can be made for the extended mind by appeal to
empirical, non-representational functionalism? Wheeler (2010)
holds that even though pure functionalism does not suffice, on
its own, to establish the truth of the extended mind hypothesis
it nevertheless promotes the idea of multiple realizability. And
the idea of multiple realizability, he holds, is pivotally impor-
tant for making a case for the possibility of extended minds.
Considerations about multiple realizablity, he holds, allow that
it could turn out that “the borders of the cognitive system . . . fall
somewhere other than the sensorimotor interface of the organic
body. And that opens the door to a cognitive system whose
boundaries are located partly outside the skin” (Wheeler, 2010,
p. 249).
As a statement of what extended functionalism is and its
conditions of possibility this is all well and good. Wheeler’s anal-
ysis sets the stage for the extended mind debate, but without
a substantive theory of cognition—one that provides an alter-
native non-contentful mark of the cognitive—empirically based
functionalism only allows for the logical possibility that minds
might extend—it does nothing more to promote the fortunes of
extended functionalism.
In what follows we will show that without the backing of
representationalism pure functionalism encounters intractable
problems of definition and demarcation—it looses its principled
basis for determining what cognitive “inputs” and “outputs” are,
and thus for saying where cognitive processes might begin and
end. Without a substantive theory of cognition to provide requi-
site backing it is not possible to determine the significance that
various facts about brains, behavior or computation have for our
thinking about the extent of cognition. Abandoning the idea that
cognition is representational—content involving—leads step-by-
step to an unthreading of empirical functionalism and ulti-
mately brings it face-to-face with old and familiar charges of its
triviality.
There is a familiar story about computers according to which
computational operations are performed on various bits of infor-
mation stored as unique strings of code. These bits of information
are conventionally identified by a unique assignment of 0’s and
1’s and at the hardware level these “codes” are said to be phys-
ically realized in the computer’s on-off states. This ensures that
a computer’s operations can be carried out purely mechanically.
It also explains the great versatility of computers, which derives
from the fact that these various sets of 0’s and 1’s can be given
different semantic interpretations. In one computer programme
what is found at a given register might be treated as a word, in
another it might be treated as a number, or in yet another, as
some geometric figure. That’s the upside. The downside is that
“If computation is defined in terms of the assignment of syntax
then everything would be a digital computer, because any object
whatever could have syntactical ascriptions made to it. You could
describe anything in terms of 0’s and 1’s” (Searle, 1990, p. 26).
Call this the problem of computational individuation.
A way around this problem is to make good on a theory of
computation of the sort offered by Piccinini (2008)—one that
understands computation in purely non-representational, func-
tional terms. This requires giving a theory or explanation that
is “sufficient to individuate computational states without appeal-
ing to either semantic or syntactic properties” (Piccinini, 2008,
p. 209).
We agree that a theory of this kind is what is needed. But
even if such a theory provides a basis for a pure functionalist
account of computation there is a need to forge a further link
so as to connect that purely functional account of computation
to cognition. In assessing the prospects of discovering that link
it is crucial to realize just how wide and unbridgeable the gap in
question really is if one adopts a non-representational notion of
computation.
We can get a grip on the magnitude of the problem by seeing
how different and distant a purely functional theory of computa-
tional individuation is from either a representational or syntactic
theory of mind. Consider that the received view takes it for
granted that, “computational states are individuated at least in
part by their semantic properties” (Piccinini, 2008, p. 205). Or,
as Fodor more pithily puts it: “there is no computation without
representation” (Fodor, 1981, p. 180). Or, again, as O’Brien and
Opie (2009) maintain “computation is governed by the contents
of the representations” (2009, p. 53).
When it comes to individuating mental states orthodox cog-
nitive science has lived by the hope that the threat of triviality
generated by the problem of computational individuation could
be avoided by a different route than that proposed by Piccinini
(2008). The problem might also be dealt with if the hypothe-
sized symbol-strings had bona fide representational properties. If
that were so classical cognitive scientists would have a toehold for
claiming that a theory of cognition that postulates symbols, with
both semantic and syntactical properties, might be true of organic
brains.
If a unified computational and representational theory of mind
could be developed to provide a justification for the realistic
assignment of contents it could thereby individuate syntactic
structures. This proposed link is clearest in the language of
thought hypothesis that invites us to imagine, put crudely, “that
human mental sentences are written on little cerebral CRTs”
(Stich, 1983, p. 53). Yet what if we abandon the idea that the
Mentalese sentences that are imagined to fill our heads are con-
tentful? Can we just drop the idea that there is a relation between
representational semantics and computational syntax by rejecting
the former while hanging on to the latter?
In order to avoid familiar worries about the casual impotency
of content, Stich (1983) proposed doing just that. He advanced
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a syntactical theory of mind according to which no such rela-
tion existed; that is to say, he proposed a retreat to a pure,
non-representational functionalism. But to abandon the idea that
mental states have semantic properties raises questions about
the very notion of syntax. What does a proponent of this view
imagine is left behind? Syntax and semantics, as classically under-
stood, are internally related: thus, it is simply not conceivable
that there can be talk of syntax in the absence of semantics. If
so, it is not clear how we might individuate mental states, carv-
ing up the mind, in purely syntactical terms without appeal to
semantic properties. Thinking that a separation between syntax
and semantics is possible is a “common but serious mistake”
(Piccinini, 2008, p. 208)4. It will only appear unproblematic that
we can talk of syntactic properties independently of semantic
properties if we imagine that syntax keeps its shape, somehow,
as a kind of shadow of semantics. Yet once semantics goes, its
shadow—syntax—goes too.
We are thrown back on the old problem that pure function-
alism always faces: how are we to define and individuate mental
states without appeal to representational properties? Certainly, we
cannot do this by appealing to bottom-up facts of neuroscience in
the absence of a substantive theory of cognition. Even Adams and
Aizawa (2010) acknowledge that:
We have no way to identify particular tokens of brain states qua
syntactic state items in order to affix contents to them. Given the
state of current science, we only identify a person’s brain states via
inferences to the content of those states (p. 72).
Our analysis takes this observation a step further: we cannot
identify a person’s brain states qua syntactic states except by
appealing to semantic properties. Once this is acknowledged it
looks as if a retreat to pure functionalism leaves us bereft of
the resources for individuating the cognitive. As the infanticidal
father of functionalism writes of his once brainchild:
One looks for something definable in non-intentional terms,
something isolable by scientific procedures, something one can
build a model of . . . And this—the “mental process”—is just what
does not exist (Putnam, 1988, p. 74).
Is this correct? Let’s address this question by examining some
recent proposals in the extended mind debate. Adams and Aizawa
(2010) advance an internalist proposal about how to individu-
ate the cognitive by appeal to two necessary conditions: (i) the
intrinsic content condition and (ii) the causal processing con-
dition. Accordingly “cognition is constituted by certain sorts of
causal processes that involve non-derived content” (p. 68, see also
Adams and Aizawa, 2001, pp. 52–53). Of course (i) has to go if we
4As Piccinini notes, “Many . . . [will assume that] computational states are
individuated by their formal or syntactic properties . . . that computational
states are individuated syntactically rather than semantically. But this is far
from the case” (Piccinini, 2008, p. 208). Putting the point more softly, P
observes “it has seemed difficult to give an account of syntactic properties
without appealing to semantic properties (cf. Crane, 1990; Jacquette, 1991;
Bontly, 1998). Nevertheless, he then adds, “I don’t know how to tell whether
a property is syntactic” (Piccinini, 2008, p. 209).
give up on representationalism. What’s left? Could appeal to (ii)
on its own provide secure basis for thinking that cognition is a
constitutively heady affair without an appeal to content? Without
CIC in play, are Adams and Aizawa right to think that the “weight
of empirical evidence” favors cognitive intracranialism (p. 74)?
It is hard to see how this could possibly be so. For given how
Adams and Aizawa set things up once we lose the first condition
we are left only with the unilluminating thought that certain sorts
of causal processes constitute cognition. That would be a kind of
internalist pure functionalism. Perhaps this internalist function-
alist proposal might be defended by appeal to the idea that we
can demarcate which causal processes are the ones that matter
by appeal to information processing differences. Yet, again, things
get tricky if we give up on the idea that informational content is
processed. Talk of information processing becomes less than per-
spicuous if no content is literally processed—once that favorite
metaphor of cognitive science gives way (Hutto and Myin, 2013,
ch. 4). Indeed, if information is understood in purely covariance
terms then an organism’s sensitivity and responsiveness to infor-
mation will be a world-involving activity, as extensive enactivism
would have it. What would warrant dividing up such a “process”
into smaller cognitive and non-cognitive parts? How, without an
appeal to content, could this lend any support for functionalist
internalism? Adams and Aizawa (2010) recognize this problem
themselves holding that unless an appeal to content is in play
the idea “that information processing constitutes the mark of the
cognitive . . . is implausible” (p. 76).
But perhaps it might be thought that all is not lost for inter-
nalist functionalism. What if there was a special way that brains
respond to information intracranially—a way that, say, marks out
such neural activity as being importantly different, setting it apart
from the way brains behave when they are engaged in activi-
ties involving, e.g., extra-cranial brain-tool combinations? Rupert
(2009) has developed arguments along these lines to support
the claim that human cognition is located “inside the organism
either entirely or in the main” (p. 45). To reach this conclu-
sion he invokes the systems-based principle—a principle that
makes no reference to representational content and thus suits
pure functionalism. Accordingly:
[A] state is a cognitive state if and only if it consists in, or is realized
by, the activation of one or more mechanisms that are elements
of the integrated set [of members] which contribute causally and
distinctively to the production of cognitive phenomena (2009,
p. 42).
How does this help? There is a continuing, well known debate
about the exact nature of mechanisms (Craver, 2007; Bechtel,
2008). Let us imagine the best case for Rupert and suppose
that all goes well with recent work on mechanisms and that it
yields a precise means of individuating them from the rest of
nature. Let us also imagine that we can determine precisely when,
where and which mechanisms are implicated in cognitive activ-
ity. Assume further that we are reliably able to discern which
are the more, or even the most, integrated mechanistic parts
of any given cognitive activity. Even in this perfect scenario it
is not clear what would license treating the non-mechanistic or
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less integrated parts of the activity as non-cognitive. That verdict
would be driven by appeal to the stipulated systems-based princi-
ple. But lacking a substantive theory of cognition—as opposed
to a theory of mechanism—what independently justifies that
conclusion? For this sort of proposal to succeed the connection
between the mechanistic and the cognitive needs be clearly
established5.
We can see the problem clearly by considering the fact that no
one in the debates about the extent of cognition denies that cog-
nitive activity involves mechanisms. What is questioned is why
anyone ought to suppose that the cognitive is limited or restricted
to certain, say, mechanistic or computational parts of such activ-
ity? Consider the analogy between perceiving and driving. Like
driving, perceiving can be understood as a situated, environment
involving activity—and nothing short of that. To be sure, driving
depends, in part, on the activity and interactions between a set of
integrated mechanisms. Moreover mechanisms are surely found
within the car, but it does not follow from that fact that driving
happens within the car. Nor is anything gained for mechanists
by noting the fact that “one can manipulate the car’s behavior
by manipulating its engine” (Noë, 2004, p. 211). For it is, of
course, equally true that one can intervene on the driving activity
by “wiggling” the (presumably) non-mechanistic environmental
features, such as the condition of the roads.
Without some further grounds for conferring cognitive status
on integrated mechanisms, other than stipulation, we face essen-
tially the same problem again: nothing justifies the assumption
that mechanisms per se pick out the cognitive6.
The root issue is that even if mechanisms feature in cognitive
activity this fact does not, by itself, tell us what significance such
mechanistic activity has for demarcating the cognitive from the
non-cognitive. To see this, note that what is intended to justify the
systems-based principle is not a substantive theory of cognition;
rather, it is the alleged empirical fact that it is by presuppos-
ing that mechanisms are where the real cognitive action resides
is what best “accounts for the successful practice in cognitive
5It is not our aim here to argue that an appeal to mechanisms must fail in
the debate about the extent of cognition. In fact, Craver mentions that some
cognitive mechanisms make use of resources outside organismic boundaries
to such an extent that “it may not be fruitful to see the skin, or the surface
of the CNS, as a useful boundary” (2007, p. 141). Kaplan (2012) applies a
mechanistic analysis to the extended mind theory. Yet for all this, a mech-
anism is—as Bechtel (2008) mentions—a structure that performs a specific
role or function in virtue of its parts, their operations, and their joint organi-
zation. In the cognitive domain, Bechtel states, what is distinctive of cognitive
mechanisms—as opposed to non-cognitive mechanisms—is that the opera-
tions of component parts involve information processing, which suggests that
information is what is operated on. However, if individuating cognitive mech-
anisms from non-cognitive ones turns on a theory of content, and if basic
cognition is non-representational and therefore non-contentful, then cogni-
tive mechanisms cannot be individuated solely by appealing to certain kinds
of contentful operations; this follows independently of the debate about where
to draw the boundaries of cognition.
6There is evidence of the inherent circularity in this sort of approach in
Rupert’s official formulation: “If there is any theoretically interesting divide
between what is distinctively cognitive and what merely causally contributes
to intelligent behavior, it is to be found in the persisting, integrated nature of
cognitive architectures” (Rupert, 2010, p. 344, emphasis added).
psychology” (Rupert, 2009, p. 43). In fact, this defense of the
systems-based approach rests on a number of disputable empir-
ical claims. The most important are that: (1) orthodox cognitive
psychology has been successful; (2) orthodox cognitive psychol-
ogy individuates cognitive activity in terms of mechanisms; (3)
that interesting laws of cognitive psychology are tied to finding
mechanisms; and (4) the latter facts (2) and (3) conspire to best
explain (1)7.
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that (1)–(4), as stated
above, are all true. That supposition poses no threat to thinking
that cognitive activity is extensive. For it may also be true that cog-
nitive psychology is or will be successful because it individuates
cognitive activity non-mechanistically and that it will discover
other interesting laws that are not tied solely to mechanisms.
There is no logical reason to exclude these possibilities in advance.
Put otherwise, without a bona fide theory of cognition, there is no
principled reason to suppose that the successes of cognitive psy-
chology depend on mechanisms, and mechanisms alone. To think
otherwise would be in the thrall of a fallacious induction. To illus-
trate: suppose that all results established in cognitive psychology
to date have individuated cognitive activity in terms of mecha-
nisms. Nevertheless, it would be a non-sequitur to assume that a
more expansive, non-mechanistic mode of individuation would
not yield significant and non-trivial results.
Dale et al. (2009) make a related point. Cognitive processes,
they assert, are too complex and heterogeneous to suppose that
one and only one framework can account for everything. Indeed,
there are positive reasons to think that there is a need to go
beyond the mechanistic and computational, narrowly conceived,
and press for a radically enactive or embodied cognitive science.
Chemero (2009) provides a clear and compelling case of the
need to do so in his argument against neural reductionism that
is “based on the details of experimental practice” (p. 170). He
cites the unhappy situation in the study of exploratory behav-
ior in animals in which cognitive psychologists systematically
under-described features of object exploration tasks such that
their findings, while not useless, were—to use Chemero’s words—
potentially confounded. The root problem is that—based on a
survey of 116 papers—the majority of work in this area inher-
ited protocols that did not detail the nature of the objects used,
and the way they could be interacted with by the animals, in their
experimental designs to an appropriate degree8.
7Evidence that such empirical assumptions are being made is easy to find:
“We think orthodox cognitive psychology places its bets on the individua-
tion of cognitive processes in terms of mechanisms.” (Adams and Aizawa,
2008, p. 125). “We think that the available empirical evidence provides good
reason to think that the chances of finding interesting cognitive regularities
covering brains and tools is low. Bear in mind that we side with what is by
all accounts scientific orthodoxy.” (Adams and Aizawa, 2010, p. 74, emphasis
added).
8Chemero (2009) reports that, “the main results of the literature survey were
as follows. Of these 116 articles, 52 (approximately 44%) gave little or no infor-
mation concerning the specific objects that were given for exploration, and
64 (approximately 56%) provide detailed descriptions of the objects. Of the
64 articles that included descriptions of the objects used in the experiments,
32 (approximately 28% of the total) used sets of objects with non-equivalent
affordances for the species of animal under study” (Chemero, 2009, p. 173).
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This is important because, as it turns out, the exploratory
activity of the species under investigation is greatly influenced
by the possibilities for action that those objects afford them. For
example, it matters very much to how an animal explores an
object whether it has properties that allow the animal to climb
it or not (as was explicitly demonstrated in experiments reported
in Chemero and Heyser, 2009). In the words of Chemero (2009)
“not all objects are created equal: their affordances really do
affect the way animals explore them” (p. 175). By thus ignor-
ing crucial differences the bulk of work in this area failed to
“give enough information about the objects used, and so failed
to meet one of the primary goals of scientific research: these stud-
ies are not replicable” (Chemero, 2009, p. 173, emphasis original).
This is alarming given that molecular neuroscientists, behav-
ioral geneticists and psychopharmacologists have relied on these
“potentially confounded studies.” This is a clear, yet probably
not isolated, case in which the need to go beyond the bound-
aries of traditional, orthodox cognitive psychology is evident
(for a recent example that shows how attention to interactive
properties of objects pays off empirically, see Morlino et al.,
2014).
Proponents of representational accounts of internalism could
respond to this problem, at least in principle. For if representa-
tions with various contents—contents that represent or stand in
for the various affordance-like properties of different objects—
feature in cognitive mechanisms then it might be possible to
explain how the objects of environmental properties matter with-
out going wide. But, importantly for our discussion here, if one
rejects representationalism such a move is unavailable even in
principle. For the version of pure extended functionalism cur-
rently under consideration the standard internalist line of reply
is closed off because the latter line of reply assumes the truth of
representationalism. Once representationalism is off the table, we
have no choice but to accept that specific properties of objects and
how organisms relate and respond to them will need to feature
in, at least some of, our best scientific explanations of cognitive
activity.
Importantly, extended functionalism plays no part in the
above argument for blocking and undermining internalist pure
functionalism. The last stage of our argument has two main steps.
First, it notes that once one goes non-representational there is no
clear scientific rationale for, and no clear theoretical means of,
thinking of cognitive activity as something smaller or shorter than
world-involving extensive relational activity. Second, it provides
positive scientific reasons for going wide. Tellingly, the parade case
we highlighted from Chemero (2009) works precisely because
it rests on a substantial theory from ecological psychology—
one that makes appeal to the notion of affordances. It is not a
mere negative inversion of internalist functionalism, such that it
assumes extended pure functionalism follows if internalist pure
functionalism fails. The positive, substantial motivation for going
wide in an extensive and not just an extended way does not
rest on functionalist considerations. This should hardly come as
a surprise for as Putnam explained long ago, when first intro-
ducing empirical functionalism, that it was only ever a frame-
work for theorizing and advancing empirical hypotheses; in itself
empirical functionalism is “the putting-forward, not of detailed
scientifically ‘finished’ hypotheses, but of schemata for hypothe-
ses” (Putnam, 1967/1992, p. 54). Yet—and here’s the rub—if
extended functionalism does not, by itself, motivate or play any
part in convincing us to go wide—if it is only a hollow theoretical
frame—we have both the option of dropping it and no obvious
reason to retain it. In this light clinging to functionalism in the
debates about the extended mind looks like nothing more than
intellectual inertia.
EXTENDED FUNCTIONALISM VIA COMMONSENSE
FUNCTIONALISM
So far so good. But, assuming the above arguments go through,
the obvious move for the extended functionalist to make is to steer
clear of empirical pure functionalism. Not only is this an obvious
response—the extended functionalists who follow Clark (2008,
2011)—have prepared this answer in advance: for their extended
functionalism is explicitly advanced under the auspices of com-
monsense functionalism. In a retrospective on his seminal paper
with Chalmers, Clark makes clear his official view on the kind of
extended functionalism he endorses “is better viewed as a simple
argumentative extension of at least a subset . . . [which is non-
committal about conscious states] . . . of what Braddon-Mitchell
and Jackson (2007) describe, and endorse, as ‘commonsense func-
tionalism’ concerning mental states” (Clark, 2008, p. 88). Or
again, “It is the coarse or common-sense functional role that, on
this model (unlike that of empirical functionalism), displays what
is essential to the mental state in question” (Clark, 2008, p. 88).
However, extended functionalism is not (nor was it originally
thought to be) an immediate or obvious consequence of com-
monsense functionalism. As formulated and advanced under the
so-called Canberra Plan that embeds the commonsense function-
alism of Lewis (1972, 1995), Jackson (1998) and Jackson et al.
(2009) and sought to reveal, through conceptual investigations,
what the folk “find obvious” about the mental—by attending to
and perspicuously representing what lies behind their thought
and talk about, inter alia, the mental; viz., to reveal the content
of our shared implicit folk theory of the mind. So conceived com-
monsense functionalism only works—it only has legitimacy—if
it descriptively captures and states only what the folk find obvi-
ous about the mental and nothing more. The project depends
on accurately characterizing our folk commitments. With this in
mind Lewis instructed commonsense functionalists to:
Collect all the platitudes . . . regarding the causal relations of men-
tal states, sensory stimuli, and motor responses. . . . Add also all the
platitudes to the effect that one mental state falls under another . . .
Perhaps there are platitudes of other forms as well. Include only
the platitudes which are common knowledge amongst us: every-
one knows them, everyone knows that everyone else knows them,
and so on Lewis (1972, p. 256).
Given this backdrop it is not obvious that unadulterated com-
monsense functionalism ought to embrace extended functional-
ism. Consider that opinions are divided about how to respond
to Clark and Chalmers’ endlessly repeated case of Otto and his
notebook. This shows that if we were only to look at the intu-
itions of the folk, as revealed by how they respond to possible
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cases, there is no obvious reason to favor extended functional-
ism over internalist functionalism. In discussing folk reactions to
these kinds of thought experiment, Chalmers—in his foreword to
Clark’s Supersizing the Mind—admits that perhaps the opponents
of the extended mind thesis “would have commonsense psychol-
ogy on his or her side. If so, then perhaps this is one point where
the ‘commonsense functionalism’ that Clark favors in this book,
individuating mental states by the roles that commonsense psy-
chology assigns to them, counts against the extended mind thesis”
(Clark, 2008, p. xii)9.
In the light of this, Chalmers recommends the following strat-
egy: “At this point, I think the proponent of the extended mind
should not be afraid of a little revisionism. Even if commonsense
psychology marks a distinction here, the question still arises of
whether this is an important distinction that ought to be marked
in this way” (xii). The obvious problem with this suggestion is
that to steer clear of commonsense is to move away from the very
project that mandates and motivates commonsense functional-
ism as described above. In its original formulation the only reason
for accepting commonsense functionalism is that it is revelatory
of what the folk think about the mental. Without that backing—
in pressing for open revisions of what the folk think—extended
functionalism would be working without a net. If extended func-
tionalists cannot fall back on an appeal to science and empirical
findings (see previous section), it is utterly unclear what could
possibly warrant or legitimately constrain the necessary revisions.
Clark (2011) recognizes the insufficiency of appealing to
purely scientific considerations that are untainted by com-
monsense to secure extended functionalism. He comments on
Wheeler’s (2011) empirical functionalist proposal for doing just
that, saying: “This is a splendid idea, but one that (it seems to me)
is almost certainly doomed to failure. The reason it is doomed to
failure is that the shape of any such scientific theory of legitimate
vehicles will surely be determined, in large part, by what we take
as central examples of real-world realizers of cognitive processes
in the first place.” (p. 452; emphasis added)
In this light, Clark (2011) maintains that individuating mental
states—“finding the mind”—by appeal to coarse-grained behav-
ior patterns using our folk psychological concepts is inevitable. He
makes this commitment to commonsense indelibly clear, when he
writes:
It is now over a decade since this question started being debated
within philosophy and cognitive science. My current view (aris-
ing from the ongoing debates with critics such as Adams and
Aizawa, Rupert, and influenced also by the rich and compelling
recent treatment in Sprevak (2009) is that this debate, though sci-
entifically important, and able to be scientifically informed, looks
increasingly unlikely to admit of straightforward scientific resolution
(p. 454; emphasis added).
9Clark (2011) observes that one of Wheeler’s (2011) reasons for steering
clear of commonsense functionalism is that: “Direct appeal to the folk intu-
itions, Wheeler claims, will either yield the wrong results (because the folk are
basically internalists at heart), or will be of little value anyway, in debates con-
cerning vehicles or realizers. Instead of appealing to the unregimented folk
intuitions, then, Wheeler suggests we should see ‘a scientifically informed,
theory-loaded, locationally uncommitted account of the cognitive” (p. 451).
In the final analysis, just like their empirical cousins, extended
commonsense functionalists need more than the observation
that commonsense tolerates the possibility that cognition might
extend. To motivate extended functionalism via common-
sense functionalism it must be established that careful atten-
tion to what the folk really think about the mental gives
us some substantive, positive reason to believe in extended
functionalism.
Where might we look for this? Arguably by examining more
closely what the folk say and do when competently deploying
their psychological concepts. However, it turns out that the best
attempts to describe folk thought and talk about the psycho-
logical presents a serious challenge to functionalism. If we are
properly attentive to the way the folk use their psychological
concepts we will be driven to abandon functionalism, not to con-
tinue to work within its template. This is because functionalism
it itself, arguably, a presumptuous imposition on commonsense
(Ratcliffe, 2007; Hutto, 2011).
The truth of functionalism is, in fact, far from obvious. It
is not at all clear that the functionalist framework is a nat-
ural part of commonsense psychology rather than something
imposed on it. Moreover, attempts to defend functionalism by
appeal to common, folk intuitions has raised important questions
about the legitimacy of appealing to intuitions to secure impor-
tant philosophical results in general (Fischer, 2011). Investigating
and detailing how the folk think and talk about the psycho-
logical “is not an easy task . . . [and] the fruits of such an
enquiry need to be distinguished from superficial and possibly
widespread intuitions” (Ratcliffe, 2009, p. 380). A proper inves-
tigation into the folk use of concepts would take “considerable
philosophical work to formulate, rather than a casual, uncon-
troversial statement of what the ‘folk’ think” (Ratcliffe, 2009,
p. 382)10.
EXTENSIVENESS EXPLICATED
Thankfully a body of detailed work examining the way our folk
concepts of mind function in everyday contexts already exists.
Wittgenstein’s reminders about the role our concepts of percep-
tion play in our lives are a prime example. His philosophical
investigations remind us of the circumstances in which we com-
petently speak of “what is seen” and the many and various ways
we have of responding to what is seen. These include diverse acts
of description—such as creating representations of what is seen—
where such representations are to be understood as acquired and
sometimes quite sophisticated ways of acting and responding to
what is seen. Distinguishing among these requires attending to
“fine shades of behavior.” For this reason the concept of seeing
is “internally linked with doing or being able to do, something,
rather than with having something that we each of us know
only from our own case” (McGinn, 1997, p. 203). McGinn pro-
vides a detailed, and mostly illuminating, analysis that everywhere
10We agree with Clark (2011) that: “There is no need for a mark of the
cognitive . . . because we already have an implicit (though probably unformal-
izable in words) grip on the kinds of coarse-grained behavior patterns that we
take to be indicative of key mental states, such as the holding of a standing
(dispositional) belief” (Clark, 2011, p. 451; emphasis original).
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stresses the indissoluble links that Wittgenstein reveals to hold
between what it is to see and our ways of responding to what is
seen (McGinn, 1997, pp. 195–204).
What we discover when examining the way our everyday psy-
chological notions function in ordinary contexts is that “inner
processes stand in need of outward criteria” (Wittgenstein, 1958,
p. 50). This appeal to the importance of outer criteria is meant to
remind us that the links between the inner and the outer are tight
and intimate. Moreover the kind of behavior and activity that
serves as a criterion for the psychological is not the mechanical
or thoughtless variety; it is—as enactivists would have it—always
and everywhere already enlivened, expressive and mindful. To
adopt this view is to move beyond familiar, textbook models of
the inner–outer relationship.
The very idea that psychological concepts pick out and
describe phenomena that could exist in an autonomous domain
which is metaphysically independent from behavior and action
is brought into question by a close examination of our ordinary
ways of speaking about psychological matters. To accept this is
to reject the standard characterization of mind as motivated by a
certain picture of our everyday psychological talk (one that pre-
tends to derive from that everyday talk itself). That picture is what
grounds the intuitions that abound about the nature of mental
states, their causal efficacy, and other related claims.
The so-called commonsense functionalist characterization of
inner mental states that it promotes—its conception of “mental
states” as “inner causes” is not a part of commonsense, rather it is
a theoretically driven picture of commonsense view of the mind.
The functionalist framework is not an innocent or inevitable
feature of our everyday talk about the psychological; it is not
built-into that discourse, it is a presumptuous imposition upon it
(Hutto, 2013). When we look (rather than “think”—that is, rather
than presupposing and imposing) we find that there are no clear
lines in folk talk about the mind that demarcate the boundaries of
cognitive phenomena neatly (Wittgenstein, 1953). Folk talk is not
designed to tell us where perceptual activity, for example, begins
and ends in any precise sense. Arguably what Wittgensteinian and
phenomenological investigations into our ordinary thought and
talk about the mental reveal is that while the folk do conceive of
cognition and perception as kinds of public activity, their spatial
and temporal boundaries are messy, rough-edged and extensive
(Hutto, in press). This is what justifies thinking of minds as nat-
urally extensive—the idea that cognitive activity always already
entangles embodiment, action, and world-involving resources
and does not restrict itself only to what is inside the individual
organism.
Does this mean the extent of cognition has no limits? Of
course not. And those limits can be revealed by empirical exper-
iment. Even if one were able to see for miles one might not be
able to see for leagues. There will be empirically discoverable
species-wide and individual differences with respect to the limits
of cognition—limits that can and should (and are being) actively
empirically explored. Rossi et al. (2014) provide an excellent
example of such an exploratory project. They seek to discover how
best to characterize a dog’s sensitivity to, and capacity to make
use of, human movements and gestures. Using a head-mounted
eye-tracking system, Rossi et al. (2014) investigate dogs’ response
profile by discovering exactly which salient features (affordances)
in the embedding environment the animal is responding to.
Crucially, they found that dogs are “especially capable of utilizing
human pointing gestures and of following our eye-gaze direction”
(2014, p. 135). This sort of experimental work on discovering
affordances promises to provide a detailed integrative account of
the limits and extent of cognition amongst conspecifics and non-
conspecifics (Chemero, 2009; Rossi et al., 2014). It is precisely at
this sort of interdisciplinary interface that philosophy and science
can and should fruitfully use to inform one another.
CONCLUSION
We hope by now to have established that the notion of extensive
minds is not hopelessly vague or ill-conceived. Indeed, we have
argued that—even if not named—it already figures in explana-
tions required by the sciences of the mind and our ordinary ways
of understanding the mental.
As a final word, it should be clear from the discussion above,
that endorsing extensive enactivism does not entail leaving neu-
roscience behind or out of the story. Even if the great bulk of
cognitive processes are extensive and world-involving there is still
every reason to understand empirically the special contributions
that brains make to enabling such cognition.
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